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INTRODUCTION
On October 7, 1992, President George Bush, President Carlos Salinas of
Mexico, and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney participated in the
signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)1 in San
Antonio, Texas. NAFTA builds upon and enlarges the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement,2 which came into effect on January 1, 1989.
NAFTA is a classic, comprehensive free trade area agreement permitted
under Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the
GATT).3 NAFTA seeks to create the largest and richest single market in
The term "America" should be understood as referring to "North and South America
together." The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (1887).
' A draft of this article was cited extensively by U.S. Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia)
in the Senate debate on NAFTA.
* B.A., St. Joseph's College; J.D., University of Michigan; Rusk Professor of Law and
Executive Director of the Dean Rusk Center for International and Comparative Law,
University of Georgia College of Law.
North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States
of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican States,
-U.S.T.-, abridged version reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 296 (1993) [hereinafter NAFrA].
2 Canada-United States: Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988)
[hereinafter CFTA].
3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GAIT]. See generally JOHN H.
JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 575-623 (1969); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 141
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the world with 380 million consumers and almost seven trillion dollars in
total output. NAFTA would eliminate tariffs and other barriers to the free
flow of goods and services among the United States, Mexico, and Canada.
It also removes barriers to investment, strengthens intellectual property
rights, harmonizes customs administration, and creates dispute settlement
mechanisms to deal with the conflicts that may arise among the three
countries.
Because the original NAFTA agreement generated controversy over
protection of the environment and workers' rights, the Clinton administration,
on August 13, 1993, announced that Supplemental Agreements4 had been
reached with Mexico and Canada on labor cooperation, environmental
cooperation, and import surges. With the completion of these side
agreements, President Clinton announced that he would submit legislation to
implement NAFTA to Congress for approval, setting the stage for an historic
decision that will profoundly affect the people of all three nations.
Although NAFTA's impact is primarily economic, it will also have a
profound political impact, especially on relations between Mexico and the
United States.5 In coming to the decision to seek a free trade agreement
with the United States, Mexico has already made important political
decisions: to jettison its defensive nationalism and fear of United States
domination; to reform and liberalize its economic system; 6 and to pave the
(1989); JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM (1990); Kenneth W. Dam,
Regional Economic Arrangements and the GATT: The Legacy of a Misconception, 30 U. CHI.
L. REV. 615 (1963); Frederick M. Abbott, GATT and the European Community: A Formula
for Peaceful Coexistence, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990); John H. Jackson, Reflections on the
Implications of NAFTA for the World Trading System, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 501
(1992); Frederick M. Abbott, Integration Without Institutions: The NAFFA Mutation of the
EC Model and the Future of the GAT Regime, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 917 (1992).
' For the text of the Supplemental Agreements, see 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1536
(September 15, 1993).
' See generally M. Delal Baer, North American Free Trade, FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1991,
132; Sidney Weintraub, US Mexico Free Trade: Implications for the United States, 34 J.
INTERAM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 29 (1992); Stephen Zamora, The Americanization of
Mexican Law: Non-Trade Issues in the North American Free Trade Agreement, 24 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 391 (1993); Sidney Weintraub, The Promise of United States-Mexican Free
Trade, 27 TEX. INT'L L.. 551 (1992).
6 Mexico joined the GATT in 1986. For a summary of Mexico's economic liberalization
process, see Jaime Ros, Free Trade Area or Common Capital Market? Notes on Mexico-U.S.
Economic Integration and Current NAFTA Negotiations, 34 J. INTERAM. STUD. & WORLD
AFF. 53 (1992); and John M. Vernon, Mexico's Accession to the GAT: A Catalyst at Odds
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way for democratizing its political institutions. The United States, in turn,
has long sought a solid foundation to overcome its often prickly relationship
with its southern neighbor and other Latin American nations. Eliminating
barriers to free trade may at long last provide the policy key to a new era of
genuine cooperation and friendly relations between the United States and
Mexico as well as the rest of Latin America.
I. FREE TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES
The heart of NAFTA is the elimination of barriers to trade in goods and
services. This is based upon the theory of comparative advantage, that
through specialization and economies of scale, international trade will
produce a more efficient employment of the productive forces of all three
nations.
Thus, Chapter Three of NAFTA broadly eliminates import duties on
goods7 and mandates that each party shall accord national treatment to the
goods of the other parties. 8 NAFTA also eliminates most other border
restrictions, such as quotas, import licenses, and various performance
requirements. 9 Import duties will be eliminated over fifteen years according
to a four-part schedule.10 Many tariffs, including about 50 percent of all
industrial tariffs, will be eliminated on the effective date of NAFTA, January
1, 1994. Other tariffs will be phased out as of 1998, 2003, and 2008. In
addition, NAFTA preserves the duty reduction schedule in the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement, which is to be completed by 1999.
Chapter Five of NAFTA harmonizes the customs procedures of the three
countries. NAFTA requires that the parties apply the same rules of origin, 2
and exporters and producers located in other parties' territories must be given
substantially the same rights of review and appeal of origin determinations
as importers in its own territory. 3 NAFTA requires also the establishment
of uniform regulations regarding the interpretation, application, and
with the Outcome?, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 717 (1993).
7 NAFTA, ch. 3, art. 302.
a Id. at art. 301.
9 Id. at art. 309.
10 Id. at annex 302.2.
1 Id.
I2 d. at ch. 5, art. 501.
3d. at arts. 502-504, 509-510.
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administration of rules of origin. 14 Customs forms, procedures, and record
keeping requirements also will be standardized.' 5 Customs user fees
charged by Mexico (0.8 percent of the value of the goods) and by the U.S.
(0.17 percent of import value) are scheduled to be eliminated by mid-1999;
user fees between Canada and the U.S. will be eliminated in 1994.16
Chapter Twelve of NAFTA broadly eliminates barriers to cross-border
trade in services, and requires that each NAFTA country accord national
17
and most favored nation"8 treatment to service providers. This liberalization
is of great importance to many professionals such as accountants, engineers,
attorneys, environmental consultants, bankers, travel agents, and architects.
Under NAFTA professional services can be provided across national borders
without relocating offices or staff as a condition to providing a service. 19
This is qualified, however, to allow each NAFTA country to keep existing
licensing requirements; but these must be transparent, be no more burden-
some than necessary, and two years after the implementation of NAFTA,
citizenship and residency permit requirements generally must be eliminat-
ed.20
It is important to note, however, that NAFTA does not provide for
freedom of movement of workers. On the contrary, NAFIA does not waive,
streamline, or otherwise affect the procedures and requirements to obtain
permanent residence in the United States. Chapter 16 of NAFTA does ease
the process of admission for Mexican citizens seeking temporary entry for
business purposes, especially (1) after-sales service providers; (2) sales
representatives and agents; (3) professionals; and (4) company executives and
management personnel." However, there will be no flood of new Mexican
workers into the U.S. labor market.
NAFTA does not directly address the sensitive political issue of illegal
Mexican immigration. However, in the opinion of thoughtful observers, the
only way to stop the export of labor from Mexico is to increase Mexican
wages and its standard of living. One of NAFTA's objectives is to remove
the incentive to cross the U.S. border in search of work. It has been
4 Id. at arts. 506-508, 511.
IS Id. at art. 505.
1 Id. at ch. 3, art. 311.
'7 Id. at ch. 12, art. 1202.
'8 Id. at art. 1203.
19 Id. at art. 1213.
20 Id. at art. 1210.
21 Id. at ch. 16, annex 160.3.
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suggested that under NAFTA Mexico may be able to increase the growth
rate of its output per worker by 1.57 percent a year and its output per worker
by 48 percent over 25 years, which would place it at the level of present-day
Spain. At that point illegal immigration may cease to be a problem.'
I. THE ECONOMIC EFFECT OF NAFTA
There is an ongoing debate about the economic impact of NAFTA.
Opponents such as Ross Perot and House Majority Leader, Richard
Gephardt, claim that NAFTA will cost the United States jobs and cause a
further decline in the standard of living in the United States.' Proponents
of NAFTA, on the other hand, claim that the agreement will produce a surge
in exports and hundreds of thousands of new jobs.' What is the truth?
In order to analyze the economic impact of NAFTA we first must put the
economies of the three countries into perspective. The United States has a
population of 265 million and a gross domestic product (GDP) of approxi-
mately $6 trillion ($6,000 billion). Canada has a population of 26.8 million
and a GDP of approximately $600 billion; Mexico has a population of
approximately 90 million and a GDP of approximately $290 billion. The
striking fact among these statistics is the small size of the Mexican
economy-less than half the gross domestic product of Canada and a tiny
fraction of the GDP of the United States. To put this in further perspective,
the economy of Mexico is approximately the size of the economy of
southern California.
Even without NAFTA, the economies of the three North American states
are closely linked. The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement of 1989 began
the phase-out of tariffs and other barriers to trade between Canada and the
United States. The result has been an increase in U.S. exports to Canada
from $72 billion in 1988 to $91 billion in 1992. Canada is the United
States' largest trading partner and the most important single market for U.S.
exports. Canadian exports to the United States are also rising, from $66
TIMOTHY J. KEHOE, FREE TRADE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1991), cited in M. Delal
Baer, FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1992, 132, 147 n.8.
23 See Ross PEROT & PAT CHOATE, SAVE YOUR JOB, SAVE OUR COUNTRY. WHY
NAFTA MUST BE STOPPED-NOW! (1993); Jackie Calmes, Gephardt Declares That He's
Against NAFTA, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1993, at A2.
2 4 See Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, NAFTA and
the U.S. National Interest, 4 U.S. DEPT. ST. DISPATCH 610 (Sept. 6, 1993).
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billion in 1988 to $88 billion in 1992.
Mexico is the third largest U.S. trading partner. Trade with Mexico has
been growing even without NAFTA. U.S. exports to Mexico have increased
from $12.6 billion in 1986 to $40.6 billion in 1992. Imports from Mexico
gained as well, from 20 billion in 1986 to $36 billion in 1992. NAFTA thus
will accelerate the inexorable trend toward the integration of the North
American economy and the growth of trade between the United States,
Canada, and Mexico.
Although it is impossible to predict the precise economic effect of
NAFTA, because predicting the future is always a risky endeavor, there is
remarkable unanimity among virtually all economists-liberal as well as
conservative-who agree that in the short and medium terms, the effects of
NAFTA will be quite small.' There are several reasons for this. First,
despite Mexico's relatively large population, its economy is quite small
relative to the United States and Canada. Even with accelerated future
growth, it will be many years before Mexico has an economy even one-tenth
the size of that of the United States, or the equal of the Canadian economy.
Thus, Mexico is not in a position to absorb huge U.S. investments and
exports; nor is it in any position to become a huge exporter into the U.S.
market.
The second reason why NAFTA will have a limited immediate impact is
that in all but a few sectors, both countries now have relatively low tariff and
non-tariff barriers to trade with each other.' The average trade-weighted
U.S. tariff is 3.4 percent, and under the Generalized System of Preferences,
about nine percent of the value of Mexican imports enter duty free; an
additional 45 percent of Mexican imports enter the United States under the
maquiladora program under which they are subject to duties only on the
portion of their value added in Mexico. Mexican tariffs also have been
reduced in the 1980s to a maximum of 20 percent, with a trade-weighted
25 See Sylvia Nasar, A Primer: Why Economists Favor Free-Trade Agreement, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 1993, at A-1.
26 See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM., Pub. No. 2353, THE LIKELY IMPACT ON THE UNITED
STATES OF A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH MEXICO (Feb. 1991) [hereinafter USITC Pub.
2353]. See also U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM., Pub. No. 2275, REvIEw OF TRADE AND
INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION MEASURES BY MEXICO AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE UNITED
STATES-MEXICAN RELATIONS (Apr. 1990) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 22751; U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMM., Pub. No. 2326, REview OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION MEASURES BY
MEXICO AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE UNITED STATES-MEXICAN RELATIONS (Oct. 1990)
[hereinafter USITC Pub. 2326].
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average of 10 percent; Mexico has eliminated quantitative restrictions on
most goods. Therefore, the relatively small trade barriers now existing
gainsay the likelihood of a huge immediate increase in trade. Furthermore,
since Mexican tariffs are on average much higher than those in the United
States, the NAFTA-mandated reduction to zero appears to be a good deal for
the United States.
The relatively small immediate impact of NAFTA is confirmed also by the
three major macroeconomic analyses of NAFTA, the Almon study,' the
Peat-Marwick study,2 and the U.S. International Trade Commission
(USITC) study." These studies, as well as other private studies, uniformly
demonstrate that all three countries will benefit from NAFTA in terms of
increase in welfare and growth in real GDP. Mexico stands to be the biggest
winner, with an estimated welfare increase from 0.11 to 5.0 percent and a
real GDP increase from 0.01 to 11.39 percent. The United States would gain
0.07 to 2.55 percent in welfare and 0.02 to 2.07 percent in real GDP.
Canada's gain would be a welfare increase of 0.03 to 6.75 percent and an
increase in real GDP ranging from 0.12 to 10.57 percent. 30
In the longer term, these calculations could change markedly. The biggest
factor in the long term is whether the Mexican economy will increase its rate
of growth. Assuming political stability, NAFTA may add about two percent
to Mexico's annual rate of growth, producing an important real change in the
size of the Mexican economy over a longer-term period such as twenty
years.3' A growing Mexican economy would appear to be in the interest
of the United States. At present, seventy percent of Mexico's merchandise
imports come from the United States, and for every one dollar increase in
Mexican GDP, fifteen cents is spent on imports from the United States. If
these figures hold, the benefits from NAFTA will increase substantially in
the longer term.
Although the effects of NAFTA will not be dramatic, especially in the
" Industrial Effects of a Free Trade Agreement Between Mexico and the USA, Research
Report Prepared for the U.S. Dept. of Labor, Professor Chopper Almon, Principal Investigator
(Sept. 1990).
2 Analysis of Economic Effects of a Free Trade Area Between the United States and
Mexico, KPMG Peat Marwick, Policy Economics Group (1991).
'9 USITC Pub. 2353, supra note 26.
10 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM., Pub. No. 2516, ECONOMY-WIDE MODEIONG OF THE
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF A FTA wrrH MEXICO AND A NAFTA wITH CANADA AND
MEXICO 6-14 (May 1992).
I' d. at 9.
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short term, there will be noticeable effects in many sectors of the United
States, Canadian, and Mexican economies. As far as the United States is
concerned, certain industries will benefit from increased export opportunities,
including chemicals, pharmaceuticals, machine tools, household appliances,
general industrial machinery and equipment, telecommunications, electronics,
and services such as banking and insurance.32 Other industries will face
increased import competition, especially from Mexico, including household
glassware, ceramic plates, horticultural products, apparel, and a variety of
labor intensive, low-tech industries, such as makers of brooms, brushes, and
mops. 33 Many U.S. industries, such as steel, energy, cement, and construc-
tion, will see a negligible immediate impact from NAFTA. 4
I. SOME SECrORAL EFFECTS OF NAFTA IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Automotive Products
Removing both tariff and non-tariff barriers retarding the export of
automotive products was one of the most important goals of NAFTA
negotiators. In large measure this was accomplished. The 2.5 percent
United States tariff on autos from Mexico will be eliminated on January 1,
1994. The 25 percent U.S. tariff on light trucks will be reduced to 10
percent in 1994 and will be phased out entirely by January 1, 1999. The 20
percent Mexican tariff on U.S. autos and 13.2 percent tariff on auto parts
will be cut in half in January 1994 and will be phased out by the end of
2003. Mexico also will phase out its non-tariff barriers-local content rules,
trade balancing rules, and quotas-by January 1, 2004. Mexico will begin
the liberalization of used cars in 2008 and allow free trade by 2019. Canada
already has removed import restrictions on used vehicles as of January 1,
1993. In order to preclude third countries from using Mexico as an export
platform of entry into the North American market, vehicles must contain
62.5 percent "North American content" (parts or labor added in North
America) to benefit from NAFTA's trade liberalization. This "rule of origin"
will be phased in by January 1, 2002.35
32 USITC Pub. 2353, supra note 26, at 4-12 to 4-27.
331 d. See Barnaby J. Feder, Tiny Industry Fears NAFTA's Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
1993, at C-1.
34 USITC Pub. 2353, supra note 26, at 4-15 to 4-27.
35 NAFTA, ch. 3, annex 300-A.
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This liberalization process should benefit the American automobile
industry by opening the Mexican market and allowing the rationalization of
investment so as to improve economies of scale and competition.26 Thus,
NAFTA will end the isolation of the Mexican automotive market and permit
Mexico to become an integral part of the North American automobile
industry. The precise impact of NAFTA on the automotive industry will
depend, however, on future decisions by the Big Three automakers and how
they restructure their Mexican operations.37 However, under NAFTA there
will be less incentive for U.S. manufacturers to transfer production to
Mexico. (For years Mexico has arbitrarily limited the importation of U.S.
built cars to 1000 per year.) This should mean more jobs for U.S. workers.
B. Agriculture
NAFTA carries important benefits for U.S. agriculture; however, certain
agricultural sectors will have to adjust to new competition from Mexico,
which should benefit U.S. consumers by lowering prices. The provisions of
NAFTA dealing with agriculture are distinctive and complex.3' Chapter 7
of NAFTA, which contains the agricultural trade provisions, separately
addresses trade between the United States and Mexico and trade between
Mexico and Canada. Agricultural trade between Canada and the United
States continues to be governed by the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement of 1989.
NAFTA will have an important impact on agricultural trade between
Mexico and the United States. Many tariffs will be eliminated immediately
so that approximately 50 percent of U.S.-Mexican agricultural trade will be
duty free at the outset of NAFTA. The remaining tariffs will be phased out,
in some cases over a period of ten years (e.g., poultry and wheat) or fifteen
years for "import sensitive" products (corn and dry beans for Mexico and
peanuts, sugar, citrus products, and certain fresh vegetables for the United
States). 39 Non-tariff barriers, such as quotas and import licensing require-
36 The North American Free Trade Agreement 28-29 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 1992).
17 USITC Pub. 2353, supra note 26. at xiii.
3 For more complete accounts, see Ruth K. Agather & Timothy N. Tuggey, The Meat
and Potatoes of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 829 (1993);
Terence J. Centner, Changes Impacting Production Agriculture: NAFTA and New
Environmental Regulations, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 371 (1993).
" NAFTA, ch. 7, arts. 701-703, at 368.
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ments, will be converted into tariffs and tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), which will
be phased out on a product-specific basis.' NAFTA continues to permit
domestic farm support measures, while somewhat disingenuously calling for
policies that have "minimal or no trade distortion effects on production."'
NAFTA does not prohibit export subsidies, but establishes a Working Group
to reach a future agreement on their limitation or elimination. 2
In addition to the relatively long phase-out periods for many agricultural
products, agricultural safeguard provisions will cushion the blow for
agricultural producers in both nations. Under these safeguards, if imports of
a product exceed a specified level, the prior, most-favored nation (MFN)
"tariffs" snap-back into place for the remainder of the year or season. U.S.
products protected by "snap-back" tariffs during a ten-year transitional period
include tomatoes, onions, eggplants, chili peppers, squash, and watermelons.
Mexican products similarly protected include pork products, apples, and
potatoes.43
Strict rules of origin also operate as safeguards. For example, orange juice
and peanut butter must be 100 percent North American to qualify for
NAFTA treatment. Dairy products must come from a cow milked in a
NAFTA country."
To provide extra protection for sugar producers, the U.S. will not have to
phase out its tariff rate quota on sugar for fifteen years. For the first six
years, the quota-tariff rate would be reduced by 15 percent each year and
removed at the end of fifteen years. The U.S. quota must be adjusted
upward only if Mexico becomes a net exporter of sugar. This is to assure
that Mexico, currently a net importer of sugar, cannot buy Cuban or
I ld. at ch. 7, art. 704, annex 764.2. "Tariff rate quota" means that an average tariff rate
is applied until a certain import level or "trigger" is reached. After that point, a higher tariff
is applied. Id.
41 NAFTA, ch. 7, art. 705. To prepare for the ending of protection of its agricultural
sector, Mexico is phasing out its politically sensitive system of price supports for corn and
other crops, replacing it with direct payments to farmers based upon the amount of land they
cultivate. The new system, which will last for the 15-year transition period under NAFTA,
is designed to lead to the development of more economically competitive farms; this will
allow farmers to grow crops that are best suited for their land or for the market. Anthony
DePalma, With Eye to NAFTA, Mexico Will Phase out Price Supports for Corn, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 1993, at D-19.
42 NAFTA, ch. 7, art. 707, at 369.
3 Id. at ch. 7, annex 704.4.
Id. at ch. 4, annex 401.1.
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Caribbean sugar to supply its own market, while exporting its own
production to the United States.45
On the whole, the agricultural trade provisions of NAFTA are favorable
to the United States. About 40 percent of Mexican agricultural products
currently enter the U.S. free of duty, while the remainder are dutiable at a
trade-weighted average of 7 percent. In contrast, Mexico's trade-weighted
duty on U.S. agricultural goods is 11 percent. In addition, Mexican
marketing orders, quotas, and licensing requirements impede U.S. imports.
U.S.-Mexican agricultural trade presently totals about $5.5 billion; $3
billion of this is U.S. exports to Mexico. With NAFTA there will be little
immediate change in farm exports and imports because of the long
transitional period that will last as long as fifteen years. U.S. farm exports
to NAFTA should gradually increase, however, so that by the end of the
transitional period American agricultural exports will be nearly $2 billion
greater than they would be without NAFTA.46 This will particularly benefit
U.S. producers of grains, oilseeds, dairy, poultry, and livestock farmers.47
On the other hand, there will be, especially in the longer term, a significant
increase in imports from Mexico, such as winter fruits and vegetables and
citrus crops." The precise extent of these long-term impacts is difficult to
measure because of the long time period before these changes are expected
s Id. at ch. 7, annex 704.2, appendix B. On November 4, 1993, the Clinton Adminis-
tration announced new accords with Mexico that will benefit U.S. sugar, citrus, and vegetable
industries. Under the sugar accord, corn syrup will be counted as "sugar" in determining
whether Mexico is a net exporter of sugar. This is to ensure that Mexico cannot avoid U.S.
tariffs by using corn syrup as a sweetener domestically while exporting other sugars to the
U.S.
The citrus accord automatically reimposes tariffs on frozen concentrated orange juice
imported from Mexico if the price falls below a specified level. With respect to vegetables,
primarily winter tomatoes and peppers, the U.S. will be permitted to expedite the reinstate-
ment of tariffs to protect against import surges that may harm U.S. growers. These accords
were reached for political reasons, to gain votes for NAFTA in Florida, Texas, and Louisiana.
See David E. Rosenbaum, Administration Sweetens Trade Agreement Terms, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 1993, at A-19.
6 U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Fact Sheet: The North American Free Trade Agreement,
1992; USITC Pub. 2353, supra note 26, at xi, 4-3 (concluding that there will be a "moderate"
increase in U.S. agricultural exports).
47 USITC Pub. 2353, supra note 26, at 4-3 to 4-13; Ruth K. Agather & Timothy N.
Tuggey, The Meat and Potatoes of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 24 ST.
MARY's LJ. 829, 854-55 (1993).
USITC Pub. 2353, supra note 26, at 4-7.
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to occur and because of uncertainty over the role of non-tariff matters, such
as sanitary and phytosanitary standards, that may affect trade flows.
C. Textiles and Apparel
NAFTA eliminates textile and apparel tariffs over ten years; textile quotas
currently in effect between Mexico and the United States49 terminate on the
date NAFTA takes effect. To benefit from this trade liberalization, a textile
or apparel must comply with a "yarn forward" rule of origin, which requires
that the good be made from yarn manufactured in a NAFTA country. For
certain products, a "fiber forward" rule applies requiring also that the fiber
be produced in North America." A NAFTA safeguard clause allows the
reapplication of the MFN tariff in the event of imports in such large
quantities so as to cause or threaten serious damage to a domestic indus-
try.
5 1
As a result of NAFTA, U.S. imports of Mexican textiles and apparel are
expected to increase, although they will have to compete with low-cost Asian
products already on the market in the U.S. 2 On the other hand, the
termination of Mexico's high tariffs on textiles and apparel will open a vast
new market for U.S. exporters. Textile exports to Mexico have grown 230
percent since 1988, exceeding $1 billion in 1992.
D. Energy
The United States, Mexico, and Canada constitute a potentially ideal
integrated market for energy. Canada is already a major U.S. trading partner
for energy, and the only market for U.S. exports of crude petroleum. A
sophisticated pipeline system links the United States and Canada. The U.S.
is a major customer for Mexican oil, and exports refined petroleum products
and natural gas to Mexico.
NAFTA should enhance this cooperation and create a true common energy
'9 Textile quotas are currently maintained under the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA),
Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T. 1001. The
MFA is an exception to the most-favored-nation principle of the GATT since it permits
country-specific import restrictions on textiles and apparel.
-1 NAFTA, ch. 4, art. 401.
51 Id. at ch. 3, annex 300 B.
52 USITC Pub. 2353, supra note 26, at 4-39 to 4-40.
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market in North America. Regrettably, NAFTA falls well short of this goal,
and will have little impact on current energy trade.
The reasons for this disappointment are complex, rooted in Mexican
history and politics, which makes oil a symbol of national sovereignty. The
Mexican Constitution of 1917 prohibits foreign investment in areas judged
"basic to Mexico's national interest,"5 3 such as natural resources. Mexico
implemented this on March 18, 1938 by expropriating foreign oil company
properties, an event which is still commemorated each year as a "day of
national dignity."
Chapter 6 of NAFTA confirms this policy: Annex 602.3 reserves to the
Mexican State all exploration and exploitation of crude oil and natural gas,
all refining and processing, and all production of artificial gas, and basic
petrochemicals. Only PEMEX (Petroleos Mexicanos),m the national oil
monopoly, may own and operate Mexico's pipelines. All foreign trade,
transportation, storage, and distribution of Mexican crude oil, natural gas, or
their by-products is exclusively reserved to the state. Although NAFTA
allows foreign trade in natural gas, PEMEX must by law handle the
negotiations and must approve any contract.
Thus, NAFTA fails to create significant new opportunities for energy trade
and will not create new opportunities for private investment in oil, gas,
petrochemicals and refining. Energy trade is further restricted because
electrical power generation remains a state monopoly of the Comisi6n
Federal de Electricidad (CFE). Thus, NAFTA will have a negligible impact
on energy trade with Mexico. Duties are already low, and their removal will
have only marginal impact.5"
Both Mexico and the United States would benefit from further liberal-
ization of energy investment and trade between the two nations. Mexico has
important petroleum reserves, but lacks the technology and capital to develop
its vast resources effectively.
3 Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Art. 27.
After an April 1992 gasoline blast that killed more than 200 people in Guadalajara,
PEMEX was restructured and four subsidiaries were created: Pemex-Exploration and
Production (E&P); Pemex-Refining; Pemex-Gas and Basic Chemicals; and Pemex-Petro-
chemicals. Each is expected to be a profit center. See George W. Grayson, Will PEMEX
Follow YPF to the Auction Block?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1993, at All.
5 USITC Pub. 2353, supra note 26, at 4-30. U.S. duties average 0.5 percent ad valorem
on crude petroleum and 1.1 percent on refined petroleum products; Mexican duties average
4.9 percent on crude petroleum and natural gas and 8.6 percent on refined petroleum products.
Id.
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Mexico therefore needs the development skills of U.S. energy companies
not only to increase exports, but also to fulfill domestic demand, which is
growing at a rate of 6 percent a year for both oil and electricity. The United
States, in turn, would benefit greatly if Mexico could become a secure source
of energy supplies.' It is unfortunate that this natural partnership between
the two nations is currently frustrated by old grievances and outdated notions
of political sovereignty. As NAFTA is implemented in other areas, however,
there will be irresistible pressures for further liberalization of the energy
sector."7
E. Telecommunications and Information Services
NAFTA will have a significant effect on telecommunications trade
between the United States and Mexico. Under NAFTA all tariffs on
telecommunications equipment will be eliminated over the next fifteen years,
and U.S. companies will be allowed access to public telecommunications
networks in Mexico for purposes of leasing private lines, attaching terminal
equipment, and performing switching, signaling and processing functions.5"
Technical standards may not be used to block access to the public telecom-
munications network.59
Foreign investment restrictions will be eliminated by July 1995, and the
cross-border provision of enhanced services such as voice mail, data links,
and the marketing of telecommunications equipment is guaranteed.' U.S.
companies will benefit from the recent privatization of Mexico's telephone
company, TELMEX (Tel~fonos de Mexico). Precise future trade flows are
m See generally, K. Shawn Kirksey, Comment, Energy and Free Trade: A New Look at
the Needs of Mexico's Petroleum Industry, 28 TEx. INT'L LJ. 539 (1993).
" Need and demand are already overcoming politics to some extent. Houston-based
Triton International was awarded a PEMEX drilling contract in 1991 and bored a successful
exploratory offshore well in a record 127 days, half of PEMEX's usual time. Another U.S.
firm, Sonat, Inc., was awarded a contract to drill six wells off Yucatin in 1992. Mexican
imports of U.S. natural gas quadrupled between 1990 and 1992, and Valero Energy Co. of
San Antonio won regulatory approval for a short gas pipeline under the Rio Grande. See
Diana Solis, Mexico Guards Its Precious Oil Business, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1992, at A10;
see generally, Bob Davis, Mexico Wins Demands in Trade Talks To Keep Full Control of Its
Oil Industry, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1992, at A3.
NAFTA, ch. 13, art. 1302.
"Id. at art. 1304.
Id. at art. 1303.
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difficult to predict because of the role future investment decisions will play
in cross-border trade, but NAFTA paves the way for integrating the North
American telecommunications market.
F. Financial Services
United States financial services companies will also prosper from NAFTA.
After a transitional period, financial institutions in the U.S. and Canada will
be able to establish wholly-owned Mexican subsidiaries to provide banking,
insurance, and securities services in Mexico.61 A transitional period was
negotiated to give Mexican firms time to adjust to increased competition.62
In banking and securities, market share restrictions would apply initially,
with gradual liberalization to the year 2004. In insurance, a market share
cap would apply until the year 2000. Foreign insurance companies will be
permitted to enter the Mexican market through a joint venture with a
Mexican company as well as through a subsidiary.
Although financial services liberalization offers great opportunity for U.S.
firms, there will not be a large immediate impact from NAFA. The long
transitional period will allow only a gradual U.S. penetration of the markets,
and the small size of the Mexican market-is a factor. For example, although
Mexico has 90 million people, its banking industry is about $50 billion
compared with the U.S. market of $2.5 trillion. Thus, the real benefits of
financial service liberalization will be felt over the long term and will depend
on a growing and increasingly prosperous Mexican economy.
IV. INVESTMENT AND JOBS
A. Investment
NAFTA establishes a policy of open investment, requiring national and
most favored national treatment for foreign investment from NAFTA
countries.63 NAFTA does away with performance, domestic content, and
61 Id. at ch. 14, art. 1404.
62 The Mexican banking system has recently been privatized. See generally, Bronwen
Davis, Comment, Mexico's Commerce Bdnking Industry: Can Mexico's Recently Privatized
Banks Compete with the United States Banking Industry after the Enactment of the North
American Free Trade Agreement?, 10 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 77 (1993).
63 NAFTA, ch. 11, art. 1102.
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nationality requirements that have plagued United States investment in
Mexico. Although there are several reservations to the principle of open
investment," the NAFTA investment chapter is significant because it goes
a long way to reverse decades of nationalistic barriers Mexico has erected
against U.S. investment.
NAFTA's investment chapter is a continuation of the current Mexican
governmental policy of reform and liberalization of foreign investment
regulations. Under the 1973 Foreign Investment Law (FIL),65 all foreign
investment had to be regulated and reviewed by the government. As a
general rule, foreign investment was limited to a 49 percent minority interest
in Mexican companies.' In 1989, however, as a part of the government's
new policy of liberalization and to encourage the inflow of foreign capital,
President Salinas issued new foreign investment regulations designed to
streamline the approval process. 67 Thus, NAFrA is not a sharp break from
present Mexican law and policy.
"Reservations include certain politically sensitive Mexican industries such as petroleum,
electricity, railroads, maritime transportation, and satellite communications. Id. at ch. 11, art.
1104. Cable television is reserved to Mexican companies, although a foreign investor may
own a 49 percent interest. Local content restrictions are retained in the automobile industry.
Id.
65 Ley para Promover la Inversion Mexicana y Regular la Inversion Extranjera, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n, May 9, 1973, translated in Mexican National Commission of Foreign
Investment, Foreign Investments: Juridical Framework and Its Application (1984) [hereinafter
FIL].
" A greater than 49 percent share could be authorized on a case-by-case basis. Id. at art.
13.
67 See Lawrence E. Koslow, Mexican Foreign Investment Laws: An Overview, 18 WM.
MrrCHELL L. REV. 441 (1992); Tomas Anthony Clayton, Josi Humberto Diaz-Guerrero, Josd
Trinidad Garcia-Cervantes, Foreign Investment in Mexico: Mexico Welcomes Foreign
Investors, 12 CHIcANo-LATINO L. REv. 13 (1992); Miguel Jauregui Rojas, A New Era: The
Regulation of Investment in Mexico, 1 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 41 (1993); Daniel M. Price, An
Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute
Settlement, 27 INT'L LAw. 727 (1993). See generally Symposium, Business and Investment
Law in the United States and Mexico, 15 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 909, 1000 (1993).
In addition to liberalizing investment laws, Mexico has implemented a program of
privatizing state-owned companies. Over 80 percent of the 1,155 government businesses were
sold or dissolved by the end of 1993. Anthony DePalma, Going Private-A Special Report;
Mexico Sells off State Companies, Reporting Trouble as Well as Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27,
1993, at Al.
[Vol. 23:461
NAFTA
B. The Maquiladora Program
The maquiladora" program, initiated in 1965, has already attracted
substantial U.S. investment to Mexico. The maquiladora program encour-
ages export oriented assembly operations whereby a U.S. or foreign parent
company exports raw materials or manufactured parts to a Mexican
subsidiary that assembles them into a finished product, which is then
exported to the United States. The program has thrived because of customs
policies in both Mexico and the United States. Equipment and materials
used in maquiladora operations are exported into Mexico under bond and are
duty free.6 Equipment and machinery needed for processing may remain
in Mexico as long as the maquiladora is in operation; raw materials and parts
may remain for up to six months.70 In order to qualify, however, 80
percent of all final products must be exported.7' Under U.S. law duties are
levied on such goods only on the value added to the products while in
Mexico.'2
The maquiladora program is designed to allow U.S.-based companies to
take advantage of low-cost Mexican labor.73 Encouraged by both the U.S.
and Mexican governments, the program has grown rapidly: the number of
maquiladora operations was 2,066 in 1991, accounting for 45 percent of all
U.S. imports from Mexico.74 Although maquiladora operations are allowed
in certain areas in the interior of Mexico, 83 percent are located along the
U.S.-Mexican border.
75
Although the maquiladora program has brought a measure of prosperity
68 "Maquiladora" comes from the Spanish verb "maquilar," which means to measure and
take dues for grinding corn; to clip; cut off; to perform services at a low cost.
6 Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n, Dec. 31, 1981.
70 Decreto para el Fomento y Operaci6n de la Industria Maquiladora de Exportaci6n,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n, Aug. 15, 1983, and Dec. 21, 1989.
71 Id.
' Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, 19 U.S.C. §1202 (1988), Items
9802.00.60 and 9802.00.80.
" See generally Kurt Kroese, Integration of the Maquiladora Program and NAFTA: A
Proposal to Protect Mexico's Economy, 10 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 113 (1993).
74 American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations, Pub. No. 0-220-
0391-5, Exploiting Both Sides: U.S.-Mexican Free Trade 4 (Feb. 1991).
75 Some maquiladora operations are owned by parent companies in Japan, Canada, and
Europe, but most are U.S. owned. Dedra L. Wilburn, Comment, The North American Free
Trade Agreement: Sending U.S. Jobs South of the Border, 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
489, 495 n.51 (1992).
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to the northern Mexico border region, it has resulted also in enormous
problems. The explosive growth along the border has produced pollution
and environmental degradation; inadequate living conditions for workers; and
allegations that U.S. manufacturing jobs are being lost to operations south
of the border. 6
C. Jobs
Critics predict that NAFTA will produce the same evils as the maquiladora
program, albeit on a larger scale. They say that American jobs will be
"sucked" south of the border on a massive scale," Americans will lose their
jobs or have to accept lower wages, and NAFTA is simply a tool to exploit
the workers of all three NAFTA countries.
Let us examine the available objective evidence to determine whether the
claims of critics that NAFTA will cause massive job flight are correct.
There have been scores of economic studies of the impact of NAFTA; the
economists appear to agree only on two conclusions: First, it is virtually
impossible to predict the precise impact on employment. Second, the effect
of NAFTA, whether positive or negative, will be quite small for the U.S.
economy and employment. 8
NAFTA critics claim that U.S. jobs will be lost based upon the wage
differential between the U.S. and Mexico--Mexican per capita income is
$3,458 while that of Americans is $22,690 and Canadians $21,245. Even in
big industrial companies in Monterrey, workers are paid as little as $6 per
day. This scenario suggests that American companies will move south in
droves to take advantage of the cheap labor.
This analysis is far too simplistic, however. If cheap wages were the only
76 See Angeles M. Villareal, U.S. Libr. Cong., Cong Res. Services, Rep. No. 91-706E,
Mexico's Maquiladora Industry (Sept. 27, 1991).
77 See generally, e.g., Ross PEROT (WITH PAT CHOATE), SAVE YOUR JOB, SAVE OUR
COUNTRY, STOP NAFTA Now (1993); William Cunningham and Segundo Mercadoo---
Llorens, The North American Free Trade Agreement: The Sale of U.S. Industry to the Lowest
Bidder, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. LJ. 413 (1993); Keith Bradsher, An Ideological Divide: Concern
Over Jobs Drives the Debate on North American Free Trade Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
8, 1992, at DI.
s See generally, William F. Spriggs & James Stanford, Economists' Assessments of the
Likely Employment and Wage Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 10
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 495 (1993); Sylvia Nasar, A Primer: Why Economists Favor Free-Trade
Agreement, N.Y. TnMES, Sept. 17, 1993, at Al.
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criteria, Haiti would be the manufacturing capital of the world. Job creation
and employment under free trade actually will be determined by other
dynamics that are hard to assess. First, all studies predict U.S. exports to
Mexico will increase, thereby increasing employment in the United States.
This may be offset to the extent U.S. companies expand into Mexico and the
U.S. imports products from Mexico, but the incentive for U.S. companies to
move to Mexico is reduced because they will be able to export to Mexico
without tariffs. Second, investment in Mexico may increase employment in
the United States. Companies that open plants in Mexico often will use
those plants to assemble components made in the United States; thus exports
often follow investment. An example of this is Japanese investment in the
United States: Japan still has a large trade surplus with the United States.
Thus, the cheap labor argument against NAFTA is fallacious all the more so
because Mexico has already greatly liberalized foreign investment regula-
tions, maquiladora plants already exist, and the U.S. economy is already very
open to low-cost imports. Another important factor is that, although
Mexican labor is cheaper, the average American worker is 4.6 times more
productive than the average Mexican worker; furthermore, the Mexican
government's economic liberalization program is clearly designed to raise
Mexican wages.79
In the face of these uncertainties, it is not surprising that the various
economic studies of the employment effect of NAFTA show results. For
example, a study by the influential Institute for International Economics
predicts a net gain of jobs for the United States of 170,000;' in contrast,
a study by Clyde Prestowitz and the Economic Strategy Institute predicts a
net loss of 420,000 jobs over the next ten years."' However, the authors
of both these studies freely admit their calculations are based upon a series
of assumptions that may not correspond to reality.82 Other employment
studies exhibit similar uncertainties, 3 including the State Department's
"Anthony DePalma, Salinas Offers Plan to Aid Mexican Economy, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 4,
1993, at Cl; Tim Golden, In Free Trade, Mexico Sees An Economy in U.S. Image, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 23, 1992, at Al; Fred R. Bleakley, Mexican Wages are Seen Rising Under
NAFTA, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 1993, at A4.
80 GARY C. HUFBAUER AND JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NAFA: AN AssESsMENT (1993).
8I Nasar, supra note 78, at C4.
82See Keith Bradsher, Trade Pact Job Gains Discounted, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1993, at
Dl; Bob Davis, Prestowitz Shifts to Support of NAFTA, Reconsiders Predictions of Job
Losses, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1993, at A4.
83See Spriggs and Sanford, supra note 78, at 519-34.
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estimate of a net gain of 64,000 jobs in the United States over the next ten
yearsY' What seems clear is that there will be no significant dislocations
of workers in the United States. There will be instances-no doubt well
publicized of factories closing and job losses; but these will be offset by
employment gains that will be less dramatic and will not get the same degree
of publicity. Furthermore, job losses to Mexico will be low-wage jobs.
Even if critics are correct, the economic effect of the loss of even a few
hundred thousand low-wage jobs over ten years will be negligible in the
United States which has an employment force of over 120 million people.
Most jobs losses would not be through layoffs but through lack of job crea-
tion. We can compensate easily for these employment losses by worker
retraining programs, which will be an essential part of NAFTA's approval
and implementation. 5 Over the course of the next decade, there is no
reason to believe that the level of employment will be any different with
NAFTA than without. Although the debate over jobs is driving the debate
over NAFTA, a much more important consideration is the overall gain in
wealth, which is estimated to be $15 billion per year to both the United
States and Mexico, if NAFTA is approved. 6
D. The Labor Side Agreement
After NAFTA was negotiated, labor groups and others raised the argument
that lax labor standards and conditions in Mexico would give Mexican
companies an unfair advantage under free trade, and United States and
Canadian companies would move to Mexico to avoid high United States and
Canadian labor requirements. This is a valid concern. In response, the
United States, Mexico, and Canada concluded a Supplemental Agreement on
Labor Cooperation8 7 on August 13, 1993.
8 Peter Truell, Administration Says Free Trade Pact with Mexico Will Create Jobs in
U.S., WALL ST. J., April 12, 1991, at A14. Nasar, supra note 78, at Al (summarizing
economic studies).
' Michael K. Frisby & Kevin G. Saiwen, Clinton Seeks Funds for Job Training Con-
sidered Vital to NAFTA's Approval, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1993, at A2. The NAFTA-
implementing legislation creates a North American Development Bank that is authorized to
aid communities and workers that may be affected adversely by liberalized trade.
" HUFBAUER AND SCHOTr, supra note 80.
8 North American Free Trade Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 10 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1547 (Sept. 15, 1993) [hereinafter Labor Cooperation Agreement].
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This Agreement creates a trilateral Commission for Labor Cooperation,
consisting of a ministerial council and a secretariat. The ministerial council,
composed of the labor ministers of the three countries, is the governing body
that supervises the implementation of the Agreement. The International
Coordinating Secretariat (ICS), headed by an executive director, carries out
the day to day work of gathering and publishing information and coordinat-
ing cooperative activities. Three National Administrative Offices (NAOs)
will be created to be the point of contact between the ICS and governmental
agencies and to implement the Agreement at the level of the parties. Each
party may convene (1) a national advisory committee made up of public
representatives and labor and business organizations and (2) a governmental
committee made up of representatives of federal, state, or provincial
governments."
The ministers may also create an ad hoc Evaluation Committee of Experts
(ECE) when necessary to provide objective, comparative analysis of specific
matters. An ECE may be called upon to provide a problem-solving
recommendation to the ministerial council. 9
Under the Labor Cooperation Agreement, each party assumes an obligation
to effectively enforce its own labor laws through "appropriate government
action." Competent authorities in each nation must give "due consideration"
to any request by an employer, employee, or other interested person for
investigation of an alleged labor law violation. There will be a wide
exchange of information by the three countries on labor laws and their
enforcement, labor market conditions, average wages and productivity, and
training and adjustment."
The Agreement provides for "cooperative consultations" and exchanges of
information between the NAOs with regard to any party's labor laws,
administration, or labor market conditions.91 In addition, any party may
request ministerial-level consultations regarding any matter within the scope
of the Agreement.' If the matter cannot be resolved after ministerial
consultations, any consulting party may request in writing the establishment
I ld. at arts. 8-18.
"Id. at art. 23. The ECE shall normally consist of three persons.
"Id. at arts. 2-3. See generally Stanley M. Spracker and Gregory J. Mertz, Labor Issues
Under the NAFTA: Options in the Wake of the Agreement, 27 INT'L LAW. 737 (1993);
Francisco Brefia Garduxo, The Impact of NAFTA on Labor Legislation in Mexico, 1 U.S.-
MEX. LJ. 219 (1993).
" Labor Cooperation Agreement, supra note 87, at art. 21.
92 Id. at art. 22.
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of an ECE, which will analyze in a non-adversarial manner "patterns of
practice by each party in the enforcement of its occupational safety and
health or other technical labor standards" as relevant to the subject of the
dispute.93 However, no ECE may be convened as to a matter that is not
trade related or is not covered by mutually recognized labor laws.9"
The ECE first presents a draft report to the council; each party may then
submit written views, which must be taken into account by the ECE in
preparing its final report. After the final report, which will be published
unless the council decides otherwise, the parties again provide written
responses on the ECE's recommendations. The final report and the
responses must be tabled for consideration by the council. 5
If the ECE's final report addresses the enforcement of a party's occupa-
tional safety and health, child labor or minimum wage technical labor
standards, any party may request in writing consultations regarding whether
there has been a persistent pattern of enforcement failure. If the consulting
parties cannot resolve the matter within 60 days, any party may request in
writing a special session of the council, which will assist the parties in
reaching a satisfactory solution. The council may make recommendations,
call on technical advisers, create working groups, or use mediation, good
offices, or any other technique to resolve the matter.96
If the council cannot resolve the matter after these consultations on the
final report of the ECE, the council, at the request of any party and after
two-thirds vote, must convene an arbitral panel to consider the matter. The
arbitral panel consists of five members chosen from a previously agreed
roster of experts.97 The function of the arbitral panel is to present to the
parties a report containing findings of fact and to determine whether the
party complained against is guilty of a "persistent pattern of failure to
enforce its labor standards in a matter that is trade related and covered by
mutually recognized labor laws." '9 The panel report must be submitted,
first, in draft to give the disputing parties the opportunity to submit written
comments. Thereafter the final report of the panel is submitted and
93 Id. at art. 23:2.
9 Id. at art. 23:3.
95 id. at arts. 25-26.
9 Labor Cooperation Agreement, supra note 87, at arts. 27-28.
97 id. at arts. 28-32.
98 Id. at art. 36.
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After the panel report has been submitted, the parties may agree on an
action plan to implement its recommendations. If agreement cannot be
reached, the council may levy a monetary assessment to $20 million the first
year after the date of entry into force of the Agreement, and thereafter, no
greater than .007 percent of the total trade in goods between the parties.100
If this monetary assessment is not paid, equivalent trade sanctions may be
invoked by the complaining party. 101
This procedure is designed to provide an enforcement mechanism for lax
disregard of labor standards. There are two obvious weaknesses in this
agreement: First, each country agrees only to enforce its own labor laws;
second, a fine of $20 million (or .007 percent of trade) seems very low.
Such criticisms, however, miss the mark. Publicity and transparency will
prove to be more effective enforcement tools than the symbolic $20 million
fine. In fact, most disputes will be effectively resolved by the council, the
ECE or the arbitral panels, so monetary and trade sanctions will not be relied
upon as the primary means of enforcement. The Labor Cooperation
Agreement thus creates an effective process for resolving disputes over
workers' rights and labor conditions in Mexico.
The Agreement also will result in upgrading Mexican labor laws and
regulations so that they are more like those in the U.S. and Canada. Each
party must "ensure that its labor laws and regulations provide for high labor
standards,"" °2 and "persons with a legally recognized interest in a particular
matter [must] have appropriate access" to administrative and judicial
remedies that comply with due process of law' °3 Annex I of the Agree-
ment specifies that all of the following issues will be addressed by the par-
ties:
I d. at art. 37.
'o Id. at annex 39.
10 Id. at art. 41. Enforcement and collection of monetary assessment against Canada
differs from enforcement and collection procedures against the United States and Mexico.
Canadian enforcement and collection will be carried out by the Commission, which is
authorized under Annex 36A to file an action for collection in a Canadian court of competent
jurisdiction. Canada also is exempt from the suspension of benefits section of the Agreement.
Id.
'° Id. at art. 2.
'03 Id. at art. 4.
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1. Freedom of association and protection of the right to
organize.
2. The right to bargain collectively.
3. The right to strike.
4. Prohibition of forced labor.
5. Labor protection for children and young persons.
6. Minimum employment standards.
7. Elimination of employment discrimination.
8. Equal pay for women and men.
9. Prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses.
10. Compensation in cases of occupational injuries and
illnesses.
11. Protection of migrant workers.
The Labor Cooperation Agreement is thus an unprecedented international
effort to upgrade and safeguard worker rights that will have a profound
effect and will result in the betterment of the lives of Mexican workers.
V. ENViRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Critics have assailed NAFTA on the grounds that open trade will weaken
environmental protection in North America. To quote a full-page ad in The
New York Times, 4 NAFTA will "kill environmental laws," "ravage
natural resources," and "create a toxic hell" on the United States-Mexican
border. As support for their opposition to NAFTA, environmental organiza-
tions like the Sierra Club and Greenpeace cite the Tuna-Dolphin deci-
sion,"° a GATT panel report invalidating a U.S. ban on the import of
processed tuna from countries that do not mandate dolphin-friendly fishing
methods (Mexico initiated the complaint against the U.S.), and the pollution
along the U.S.-Mexican border. They also cite the poor enforcement of
environmental laws in Mexico and make common cause with U.S. labor
unions in arguing that under NAFTA Mexico will become a "pollution
104 Fatal Flaws of NAFTA, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1993, at All.
"o United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna: Report of the Panel, GATT Doc.
DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter Panel Report].
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haven" for U.S. companies desiring to avoid strict environmental regula-
tion.'06
These criticisms are misguided. On the contrary, NAFTA is the first
international trade agreement to address environmental concerns in a serious
manner, and the environmental provisions of NAFTA were drafted in close
consultation with the environmental community.O7  The prospect of
NAFTA has focused attention on environmental problems in Mexico, which
has responded by upgrading environmental laws and their enforcement."06
There is no doubt that NAFTA will enhance environmental quality, and
rejection of the treaty would be a defeat for environmental values.
Let us examine the environmental issues raised by NAFTA.
A. Product Standards
Environmentalists critical of NAFTA raise two concerns with respect to
product standards relating to environmental quality, health, and safety. First,
it is said that NAFTA will lead to a lowering of such standards; second, that
higher U.S. product standards may be invalidated by a trade tribunal
convened pursuant to NAFTA or the GATI. 1"
From the viewpoint of international trade, national environmental, health,
and safety standards are a concern for several reasons. They may serve
protectionist purposes by favoring domestic producers who are better able to
meet the applicable requirements. For example, the U.S. has attacked a
European Community ban on hormone-treated beef imports as disguised
protectionism. Even in the absence of protectionism, differing product
" Tim Golden, A History of Pollution in Mexico Casts Clouds Over Trade Accord, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 1993, at Al. Not all environmental organizations oppose NAFTA. Some
groups like the National Audubon Society and National Wildlife Federation have concluded
that approving NAFTA will be better for the environment. See Sanford E. Gaines,
Environmental Laws and Regulations After NAFTA, 1 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 199 (1993);
Environmental Movement Splits Over Big Groups' Support for Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
17, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Environmental Movement Splits].
107 Environmental Movement Splits, supra note 106.
log See The Mexican American Border, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 1992, 21; Mexican
Environment Unit to Spend $203 Million on Sewage, Other Projects, 10 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 623 (August 25, 1993).
'09 See Patti Goldman, The Legal Effects of Trade Agreements on Domestic Health and
Environmental Regulation, 7 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 11 (1992). See also Marian Burros,
Eating Well, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1993, at C2.
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standards in different countries creates added costs and scale diseconomies
for producers who sell in many national markets. Thus, differing product
standards can be "technical" or non-tariff barriers to trade.
At the same time, there are legitimate reasons for differing national
product standards. Nations may differ on the appropriate formulation of
standards, reflecting disagreements over the extent of the risk posed by the
product or the acceptability of risk to their societies. Product standards may
differ also because of local conditions.
The logical way to deal with this issue in a trade agreement is to promote
"harmonization" of product standards, which allows essential differences to
remain, but promotes the reconciliation of national standards to the
maximum extent possible. NAFTA addresses harmonization of standards in
Chapter 7, dealing with sanitary and phytosanitary measures; in Chapter 9,
dealing with technical standards; and in the Supplemental Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation. The essential question is whether NAFTA, in
the harmonization process, will cause a lowering or raising of environmental
standards.
There is no question that NAFTA promotes the raising of environmental
product standards and the principle of upward harmonization. The section
on Compatibility and Equivalence of Standards provides that the parties
shall, to the "greatest extent practicable," make their product standards
compatible, but "[w]ithout reducing the level of safety or of protection of
human, animal or plant life or health, the environment or consumers."110
The Subchapter on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures contains a similar
provision."' This language would appear to prohibit a NAFTA party from
lowering its environmental standards to achieve compatibility of standards.
By implication, if standards are to be made compatible, the party with the
lowest standards would have to raise them to the level of the others.
This upward harmonization goal is made explicit in the Supplemental
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation of 1993.112 This agreement
requires each NAFTA party to "ensure that its laws and regulations provide
for high levels of environmental protection and [to] strive ... to improve
"o NAFTA, at ch. 9, art. 906(2).
.. Id. at ch. 7, art. 756(l).
112 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Between the Government
of Canada, the Government of the United States of America, and the Government of the
United Mexican States, Sept. 14, 1993, -U.S.T._ [hereinafter Environmental
Cooperation Agreement].
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those laws and regulations." 3 The Environmental Agreement also provides
for a council, comprised of cabinet-level representatives of the parties, with
the duty, among others, to strengthen cooperation on the continuing
improvement of environmental laws and regulations.'
1 4
Another important question in the standards debate is whether NAFTA
threatens the validity of U.S. federal and state environmental and health
regulations. Some environmentalists charge that NAFTA may preempt such
U.S. laws as obstacles to international trade."' Citing the Tuna-Dolphin
case"' and other GATT panel decisions, they argue that such laws as the
Delaney Clauses in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act" 7 which
prohibit the use of carcinogenic food additives in foods, as well as state laws
that prohibit adulterated food, restrict pesticide residues, or require food
labeling, might be unenforceable against imports.1
s
Such fears are groundless. To the contrary, NAFTA, unlike other trade
agreements, including the GATr, contains language designed to uphold the
validity of high environmental standards even when they are more stringent
than international standards. Chapter 9, concerning general products
standards, affirms the right of each NAFTA party to establish levels of
environmental protection that "it considers appropriate" in accordance with
its own risk assessment procedures." 9 Although international standards
shall be used as a basis, higher standards may be maintained by a party
"pursuing its legitimate objectives."'tm Standards-related measures must
not discriminate, in the sense that domestic goods must be treated the same
as imports,' and a standards-related measure cannot be an "unnecessary
obstacle to trade."'22 However, an unnecessary obstacle to trade shall not
be deemed to be created if the demonstrable purpose of the standard is to
"' Id. at art. 3. Article 5 also provides for "high levels of enforcement" of environmental
laws. Id. at art. 5.
4 ld. at art. 10(3).
NS See e.g., Steve Charnovitz, NAFTA, An Analysis of Its Environmental Provisions, 23
ENVTL. L. REP. 10067 (1993).
16 Panel Report, supra note 105.
11 21 U.S.C. §§ 348(c)(3), 376(b)(5)(B) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
"s Goldman, supra note 109, at 19.
119 NAFTA, at ch. 9, art. 904(2).
'2' Id. at art. 905(3).
121 Id. at art. 904(3).
122 Id. at art. 904(4).
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achieve a "legitimate objective.""
Thus, the all-important criteria in NAFTA standard-setting are (1) non-
discrimination and (2) legitimate objective. The latter term is defined as
including:
a. safety;
b. protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the
environment or consumers. . .; or
c. sustainable development, considering, among other
things, where appropriate, fundamental climatic or other
geographical factors, technological or infrastructural factors,
or scientific justification, but.., not.., the protection of
domestic production."
Thus, it can be stated categorically that a general product standard that is
demonstrably related to the objectives of environment, health, or safe-
ty-"legitimate objective[s]" under NAFA-will be valid as long as it does
not discriminate in favor of domestic producers.
The NAFTA provisions relating to sanitary and phytosanitary (S&P)
standards are similar in that they specifically allow each party to establish its
own "appropriate level of protection"" in accordance with "risk assess-
ment"' procedures. There are, however, four limitations: sanitary and
phytosanitary standards must (1) be based upon scientific principles, (2)
avoid arbitrary discrimination, (3) be applied "only to the extent necessary
to achieve its appropriate level of protection, taking into account technical
and economic feasibility," and (4) not be a disguised restriction on trade
among the parties."7
These conditions should not pose a threat to high U.S. environmental
standards that apply to domestic products as well as imports. Although S&P
standards must be based upon scientific principles, including an appropriate
assessment of risk, all that is required is a scientific basis, not conclusive
scientific proof. S&P standards must be "necessary," but this is defined in
terms of the "appropriate level of protection" in accordance with risk
'2 Id. at art. 904(4)(a).
i2 Id. at art. 915(1).
125 Id. at ch. 7, art. 712(2).
126 Id.
127 Id. at art. 712(3)-(6).
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assessment procedures. Since risk assessment is a political judgment, it
would appear that if zero risk was deemed by a party to be the appropriate
level of protection, this would be acceptable under NAFTA. Thus, the
NAFTA treatment of S&P standards is less restrictive than proposals in the
GATT, which require S&P measures to be the "least restrictive to trade."'"
B. Process Standards
Many environmentalists are disappointed in NAFTA because it does not
directly address process standards or PPMs (processes and production
methods). In contrast to product standards, process standards regulate the
way in which a product is manufactured, harvested, or extracted. PPMs have
become a cause celebre because of the Tuna-Dolphin decision,'" in which
the GAT panel drew a sharp distinction between the product and the way
it is produced, concluding that import restrictions cannot be used to enforce
PPMs. 1
3°
NAFTA rightly does not authorize import restrictions on products because
of the way in which they are produced, harvested, or extracted. Upholding
the unilateral imposition of PPMs is a recipe for chaos. Every nation would
enter the fray, and there would be endless trade restrictions without any
benefit to the environment, as every nation would simply demand compli-
ance with its own standards. International trade as well as environmental
protection would suffer the consequences. It is thus better to address the
issue of process standards by endorsing multilateral solutions and improving
environmental regulation and enforcement in Mexico.
C. Environmental Measures and Investment
NAFTA contains a precedent-setting provision that "it is inappropriate to
encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety, or environmental
measures."13' Environmental measures designed to "ensure that investment
"28 Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, § L(c), 21, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991) (The Dunkel Draft).
129 Panel Report, supra note 105.
130 Id. For further discussion of this distinction, see Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free
International Trade and Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 700 (1992).
131 NAFTA, at ch. 11, art. 1114(2).
1993]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
activity is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns" are
specifically encouraged.132 These provisions, along with the sanctions
provided in the Environmental Side Agreement for lax enforcement of
environmental standards, are designed to ensure that Mexico does not
become a "pollution-haven" for companies desiring to avoid strict environ-
mental standards. 33
D. Border Pollution
One of the most urgent existing problems between the United States and
Mexico is the pollution and environmental degradation that infects the 2000
mile-long U.S.-Mexican border region. Spurred by rapid growth of the
maquiladora program, there has been a tremendous increase in population
along the border, and industrialization has outpaced resources." As a
result, a crisis situation has developed. 35  The American Medical
Association has described the border region as a "virtual cesspool and
breeding ground for infectious disease."'1 Uncontrolled air and water
emissions have caused serious transboundary pollution affecting cities in the
U.S. 37 Rapid development has overwhelmed shared water resources, and
there are serious water shortages throughout the border region.1 38  There
is also evidence of illegal disposal of hazardous waste in Mexico by
132 Id. at art. 1114(1).
'3 It should be pointed out, however, that there is no evidence that alleged competitive
advantages created by lax pollution controls in Mexico have played a substantial part in
decisions to invest in Mexico. See GENE M. GROSSMAN & ALAN B. KRUEGER, ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPACTS OF A NORTH AMERIcAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 6 (National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper No. 3914, 1991).
'3' The population of the major sister cities on the Mexican side of the border doubled
from 1980 to 1990. Brenda S. Hustis, Note, The Environmental Implications of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 28 TEX. INT'L LJ. 589, 594 (1993).
135 See generally, Michael Connor, Comment, Maquiladoras and the Border Environment:
Prospects for Moving from Agreements to Solutions, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
683 (1992).
136 Michael Satchell, Poisoning the Border, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 6, 1991, at
32, 34.
137 See Connor, supra note 135, at 685-90.
3 See Farah Khakee, Comment, The North American Free Trade Agreement: The Need
to Protect Transboundary Water Resources, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 848 (1993); Malissa H.
McKeith, The Environment and Free Trade: Meeting Halfway at the Mexican Border, 10
U.C.L.A. PAC. BASIN L.J. 183 (1991).
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maquiladora plants. 139
Until recently, Mexico has had neither the will nor the resources to cope
with these problems. Mexican environmental laws are not well enforced.
The Mexican environmental ministry, the Secretariat of Social Development
(SEDESOL, formerly a subsecretariat of the Secretariat of Urban Develop-
ment and Ecology, SEDUE) is underfunded and understaffed."4 Despite
a 1983 U.S.-Mexico Agreement to Cooperate in the Solution of Environmen-
tal Problems in the Border Area,' and despite the significant work of the
U.S.-Mexico International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), 42
border environmental conditions have continued to deteriorate. 43
NAFTA is the best hope for getting border pollution problems under
control. First, the mere prospect of NAFTA has focused attention on the
border pollution problem and spurred Mexico to upgrade both its environ-
mental laws and enforcement. In August 1993, SEDESOL announced that
it would be spending $263 million on urban projects, including sewage
treatment plants along the U.S.-Mexican border, over the next ten years.'"
The Mexican General Ecology Law of 1988, 41 which covers a full range
of environmental problems including air and water pollution, hazardous
waste, toxic substances, pesticides, and conservation of natural resources,
increasingly is being implemented and enforced. Mexico has increased its
environmental budget tenfold since 1989. Although serious inadequacies
13 See Hustis, supra note 134, at 600-02.
140 For detailed treatment of Mexican environmental law, see McKeith, supra note 138;
Hustis, supra note 134; Terzah N. Lewis, Environmental Law in Mexico, 21 DENy. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 159 (1992); Connor, supra note 135; Greg M. Block, One Step Away from
Environmental Citizen Suits in Mexico, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,347 (1993).
14' Agreement to Cooperate in the Solution of Environmental Problems in the Border
Area, Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 10,827.
"
2 See generally, Stephen P. Mumme, Innovation and Reform-in Transboundary Resource
Management: A Critical Look at the International Boundary and Water Commission, United
States and Mexico, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 93 (1993).
143 See Robert Tomsho, Environmental Posse Fights a Lonely War Along the Rio Grande,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1992, at Al; Tim Golden, Fear of Pollution at Mexican Plant, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1993, at A7; John Holusha, Trade Pact May Intensify Problems at the
Border, N.Y. TIMs, Aug. 20, 1992, at D6.
' Mexican Environment Unit to Spend $263 Million on Sewage, Other Projects, 16 INT'L
ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 623 (Aug. 25, 1993).
145 Ley General de Equilibrio Ecologico y de Protecci6n al Ambiente, 412 DIARIO
OFICAL, Jan. 28, 1988 (translated as General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environ-
mental Protection).
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remain,"4 the Mexican government is now unquestionably serious about
pollution abatement.
Second, NAFTA will have a beneficial impact on the border pollution
problem because there will be more incentives to modernize the maquiladora
plants since the restrictive conditions under which they operate will no
longer apply. Under NAFTA, much new development will be shifted from
the maquiladora region to other parts of Mexico.
In the future, the maquiladora plants will have to adopt a proactive,
preventative approach to environmental management, as is presently required
of industries in the United States and Canada. 47
Third, NAFTA has reinvigorated U.S.-Mexican environmental cooperation
on the solution of border environmental problems. The EPA and SEDUE
have prepared an Integrated Environmental Plan for the Mexican-U.S. Border
Area,'" which provides a framework for addressing cross-border environ-
mental issues. Although this plan has been justifiably criticized as merely
a "plan to make plans"'49 rather than concrete commitments, it is neverthe-
less a significant first step that is due to be reviewed in 1994. The U.S. and
Mexico have completed plans for a jointly administered international air
quality management district for the twin border cities of El Paso and Ciudad
Juarez. se In addition, the U.S. and Mexico will create a joint agency, the
Border Environmental Cooperation Commission, that will have the power to
issue $6 billion to $8 billion in bonds to help finance the cleanup of the
border region.' These cooperative efforts will be in jeopardy if NAFTA
'46 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., U.S.-MEXICo TRADE: ASSESsMENT OF MEXICO'S
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS FOR NEW COMPANIES (1992). See generally Albert E. Utton,
Protecting the Environment in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region, 1 U.S.-MEX. LJ. 211 (1993).
47 See Edward M. Ranger, Jr., Environmental Regulation and Enforcement in Mexico,
THE MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY ANN. REV. (1991) (in Spanish and English) (detailing
enforcement procedures and providing practical guides to compliance).
14' U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND SECRETARIA DE DEsARROLLO
URBANO Y ECOLOGICO, NEGRATED ENViRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MExICAN-U.S. BORDER
AREA (First Stage, 1992-1994) (1992).
"49 See Hustis, supra note 134, at 629.
"0 Andy Pasztor, U.S., Mexican Officials Plan to Create Air Pollution Zone for Border
Residents, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1993, at A4. For a general review, see Alberto Szekely,
Emerging Boundary Environmental Challenges and Institutional Issues: Mexico and the
United States, 33 NAT. REsOuRCEs J. 33 (1993).
"'t Keith Bradsher, Trade Pact May Hinge on Border-Bond Plan, N.Y. TIMEs, July 29,
1993, at Dl. Agreement on the creation of the border cleanup financing agency was
announced by the U.S. and Mexico on August 15, 1993.
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is not approved.
E. Environmental Enforcement: The Side Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation
Because of U.S. concern over the lax enforcement of environmental laws
in Mexico and the real or imagined fear that Mexico will become a
"pollution haven" attracting U.S. businesses, the United States, Mexico, and
Canada concluded a Side Agreement on Environmental Cooperation152 in
August 1993. The environmental pact is far-reaching and precedent-setting;
it is designed to make sure that no participating nation can gain a competi-
tive advantage in trade by failing to enforce environmental laws.
The Agreement creates an important new three-nation bureaucracy, a
Commission on Environmental Cooperation with three parts: a Council
composed of the three countries' top environmental officials, a central
Secretariat, and a Joint Advisory Committee made up of non-governmental
organizations from the three countries.153
The Commission for Environmental Cooperation has a broad agenda. It
may address virtually any environmental concern, including transboundary
and border environmental issues, the environmental implications of process
and production methods, the conservation of fauna, flora, and natural areas,
as well as approaches to governmental enforcement and compliance.'m
The Secretariat serves as the point of inquiry for public concerns about
environmental quality. 155 Any person may file a submission asserting that
a party to the Agreement is failing to enforce its environmental laws. The
Secretariat may develop a factual record, which must be made public, and
bring the matter to the attention of the Council." s
The Agreement also sets up a dispute resolution process for use when
there is evidence of a "persistent pattern of failure" by any party to
effectively enforce its environmental law. 5' The first stage, after a request
in writing, is consultation between the concerned parties.' 58 If this is
152 Environmental Cooperation Agreement, supra note 112.
153 Id. at art. 8.
'54 Id. at art. 10.
155 Id. at art. 14.
'56 Id. at art. 15.
117 Id. at art. 22.
158 Id.
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ineffective, a special session of the Council may be convened to consider the
matter. The Council may create a technical group or committee of experts,
submit the matter to good offices, conciliation, mediation, or make
recommendations for the resolution of the dispute. 59
If the matter remains unresolved 60 days after the Council meeting, an
-irbitral panel may be created by two-thirds vote of the Council to consider
the matter where the alleged persistent pattern of enforcement failure relates
to "a situation involving workplaces, firms, companies or sectors that
produce goods or provide services (a) traded between the territories of the
Parties; or (b) that compete, in the territory of the Party complained against,
with goods or services produced or provided by persons of another
Party."' 6 If the arbitral panel determines that there has been a persistent
pattern of enforcement failure, the disputing parties are to agree on a
mutually satisfactory Action Plan to resolve the problem. Failure to
implement the Action Plan will result in a monetary assessment or trade
sanctions as in the case of a similar failure under the Labor Cooperation
Agreement. 161
F. North American Environmental Cooperation
Taken together, NAFTA and its associated agreements constitute a
remarkable charter for environmental cooperation in North America.
NAFTA sets a new precedent by its Preamble, affirming that trade liberal-
ization and economic development must be consistent with the principle of
sustainable development and other environmental goals. NAFTA also
provides that specific trade obligations set out in certain multilateral inter-
national environmental and conservation agreements are paramount. 62 The
Environmental Side Agreement breaks new ground by making the enforce-
ment of national environmental laws and the achievement of a high level of
environmental protection an international obligation of the parties. The
creation of a bilateral financing agency to address transborder pollution is
another first. NAFTA may be a trade agreement, but an important result is
a foundation for building environmental cooperation on a continental basis
'" Id. at art. 23.
'60 Id. at art. 24.
161 See text accompanying notes 100-101. In Canada, enforcement and collection is
handled through the Canadian court system. See supra note 101.
'6' NAFTA, ch. 1, art. 104.
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in North America.' 63
VI. SAFEGUARDS
NAFTA contains three different kinds of safeguard mechanisms to assure
that particular domestic industries and workers can adjust to free North
American trade. First, there are sector-specific safeguards in the form of
long transition periods for trade liberalization, up to 15 years for sensitive
products such as household glassware, footwear, and certain agricultural
products. Second, a bilateral safeguard procedure may be invoked so that
tariffs "snap-back" to pre-NAFTA levels for up to three years (four years for
"extremely" sensitive products) if increased imports cause or threaten serious
injury to a domestic industry.1 " Third, a global safeguard mechanism may
be invoked which allows the imposition of temporary tariffs or quotas on
NAFTA imports, as well as on imports from other countries, as part of a
GATT escape clause proceeding where imports are a substantial cause or a
threat of serious injury. 65 A NAF7A Supplemental Agreement on Import
Surges establishes an "early warning system," a mechanism for consultations
among the NAFTA countries.1" The NAFTA legislative package also
contains funding for worker adjustment assistance.
An important NAFTA safeguard is strict country-of-origin rules so that
non-NAFTA nations cannot use a NAFTA country as a low-tariff export
platform for entry into the North American market. NAFTA is therefore
designed to limit the benefits of the agreement to products originating in
'6 See generally Albert Szekely, Establishing a Region for Ecological Cooperation in
North America, 32 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 563 (1992). Ironically, despite NAFTA's great
importance for environmental law, a Court of Appeals has concluded that no environmental
impact statement need be prepared under the National Environmental Policy Act. Public
Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993). For a further
discussion of this case see Kristin Loecke, Recent Development, The National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 and Its Implications for NAFTA: Public Citizen v. United States Trade
Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C.), rev'd 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 23 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. - (1993).
'"NAFTA, ch. 8, art. 801.
"3Id. at art. 802. GATT escape clause proceedings may be initiated under U.S. law
pursuant to section 201 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1974. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1988).
'6 Understanding Between the Parties to the North American Free Trade Agreement
Concerning Chapter Eight-Emergency Action, Sept. 13, 1993 (text released by the U.S.
Office of Trade Representative, Sept. 15, 1993), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Extra
File.
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North America. When an article produced in North America incorporates
components or materials of foreign origin, rules of origin come into play to
determine whether it is eligible for NAFTA benefits.
Under Article 401 of NAFTA a product will be considered of NAFTA
origin if:
(1) produced exclusively in a NAFTA country from
materials originating in a NAFTA country; or
(2) produced in a NAFTA country from non-NAFTA
components or materials that are in a different tariff clas-
sification than the final product.
This is the "tariff shift" rule of origin that allows a product with foreign
components NAFTA treatment if the final product is in a different tariff
classification from any of the components or raw materials used in its
manufacture. Thus, for example, wood molding made from logs imported
from outside North America would qualify as a NAFTA product because
wood molding and logs fall into different tariff classifications. 67
Thus, for most products, there is no minimum domestic or North
American content required to qualify for NAFTA benefits."~ For some
products, most notably autos and auto parts, there is a North American
minimum content requirement in addition to the tariff shift rule. For
example, passenger autos, light trucks, and engines must contain a NAFTA
'67 This is qualified by a de minimis rule that the product will be considered of NAFTA
origin regardless of the tariff shift rule if the value of all non-originating materials that do not
undergo the tariff shift is not more than seven percent of the total value of the product.
In addition, if the assembly of parts and components in the NAFTA zone is sufficiently
complex so as to account for 50 percent of the net cost or 60 percent of the value of the
finished product, it will be considered a NAFTA product regardless of the tariff shift test.
NAFTA, ch. 4, art. 401(d)(i)-(ii).
See generally, Jimmie V. Reyna, A Preliminary Review of the Operation and Effect of the
NAFTA Rules of Origin, 1 U.S.-MEX. L. 127 (1993).
168 In this regard, NAFTA rules of origin are simpler than other U.S. rule-of-origin
requirements. For example, the U.S. Customs general standard for determining rule of origin
is the "substantial transformation" test, which requires a substantial transformation of each
component. In addition, some U.S. preferential duty programs, such as the Generalized
System of Preferences, require a specified percentage of value (35 percent) to be imparted in
the country claiming the duty preference. See e.g., Torrington Co. v. United States, 596 F.
Supp. 1083 (Ct. Int'l Trade, 1984), aff'd, 764 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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content, calculated on a net cost basis,'69 of 56 percent beginning in 1998,
and 62.5 percent beginning in 2002. For textiles, a "yam forward" rule
requires that textiles and clothing must be produced from yam produced in
a NAFTA country.
NAFTA also eliminates duty drawback programs for NAFTA goods by
January 1, 2001.170 Duty drawback allows the refund or waiver of the
customs duties paid on imported materials subsequently exported in the same
or a transformed condition to another country. The elimination of such duty
drawbacks means that the tariffs Mexico imposes on non-North American
components for use in finished products bound for the United States or
Canada will not be reimbursable.
Through the application of these rules of origin and the elimination of
duty drawbacks, NAFTA minimizes the incentive for producers to import
inputs from non-NAFTA countries instead of purchasing NAFTA origin parts
and materials.
VII. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
NAFTA contains strong protection for intellectual property rights in
original ideas, creative forms of expression, new discoveries, inventions, and
trade secrets. In virtually every category of intellectual property-patent,
copyright, trademark, protection of business "know-how" by trade secret
regulations, and semiconductor technology-NAFTA requires minimum
levels of protection that lock in recent improvements in Mexican law171
that were long sought by U.S. companies.
In the area of copyright, NAFTA requires each party to protect the full
169 "Net Cost" means the total cost of producing the good minus the price paid for non-
NAFTA-origin parts or materials. In calculating net cost, the producer may exclude sales,
marketing, servicing, royalty, shipping, and non-allowable interest costs. This formula is
easier to apply than the applicable method under the Canada-U.S. FTA. See Frederic P.
Cantin and Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Rules of Origin, The Canada-U.S. FTA, and the Honda
Case, 87 AM. J. INT'L. L. 375 (1993).
'70 NAFTA, ch. 3, art. 304(4).
17' Mexico enacted a landmark intellectual property law in 1991. See Gabriel Garcia,
Economic Development and the Course of Intellectual Property Protection in Mexico, 27 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 701 (1992).
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range of works covered under the Berne Convention" 2 as well as all types
of computer programs. 73  NAFTA extends protection to trademarks,
including service marks and so-called "famous marks" that are well known
in the infringing territory even if not registered there. 74 NAFTA requires
each party to make patent protection available for a term of at least 20 years
from the date of filing or 17 years from the date of grant.77 NAFTA is
the first international trade agreement to give express protection to trade
secrets and proprietary information. 76 Layout design of semiconductor
integrated circuits is fully protected.1" NAFTA also harmonizes and
requires effective enforcement procedures.178 NAFTA grants Canada, but
not Mexico or the U.S., the benefit of a "cultural exemption" that enables
that country to take whatever action it may deem necessary to exclude non-
Canadian cultural materials, such as magazines, books, motion pictures, and
sound recordings."'
VIII. COMPETITION POLICY
Under NAFTA Canada, Mexico, and the United States agree to begin
coordination of their respective laws and policies on competition and
monopolies. Article 1501 recognizes the importance of cooperation and
coordination in this area, and the parties pledge to proscribe anti-competitive
business conduct and to render mutual legal assistance, notification,
consultation, and exchange of information on antitrust issues. NAFTA
nevertheless tries to balance the vigorous application of antitrust principles
with a recognition of Mexico's tradition of state enterprises and monopolies.
Article 1503 allows any party to establish a state-owned enterprise at its
"2 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
revised in Paris on July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. Art. 2 of the Berne Convention protects
literary and artistic works such as translations, compilations and collective works, drama,
choreographic works, music, film, photographic works, drawings, paintings, architecture,
sculptural maps, plans, and works of applied art.
I" NAFTA, ch. 17, art. 1705-1706. See generally Charles S. Levy and Stuart M. Weiser,
The NAFTA: A Watershed for Protection of Intellectual Property, 27 INT'L LAW. 671 (1993).
174 NAFrA, ch. 17, art. 1708.
'7 Id. at art. 1709.
176 Id. at art. 1711.
'7" Id. at art. 1710.
378 Id. at art. 1714.
179 Id. at ch. 21, annex 2106.
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discretion; the state enterprise must not impinge on the NAFTA rights of
open investment and must make its goods or services available on a non-
discriminatory basis. Article 1502 allows any party to designate a monopoly.
However, that monopoly must act "solely in accordance with commercial
considerations" in selling or purchasing."s It cannot discriminate against
the goods or services of another party in buying or selling the monopoly
good or service, and it cannot engage in anti-competitive acts in non-
monopoly markets, such as through refusals to deal, cross-subsidization, or
predatory conduct.
This scheme obviously creates an uneasy tension between the policy of
free and open competition traditionally enforced by Canada and the United
States and the weak antitrust enforcement policy of Mexico. A host of
problems are left unaddressed, and compared to the global movement toward
harmonization and. coordination of antitrust policies, it is surprising that
NAFTA provides so little guidance. NAFTA also exempts antitrust
enforcement issues from the dispute settlement provisions, so the inevitable
problems will have to be dealt with by direct consultations among the
parties. Article 1504 of NAFTA accordingly establishes a trilateral Working
Group on Trade and Competition to deal with "issues concerning the
relationship between competition laws and trade" '' in the North American
free trade zone. This body is sure to have its hands full.18 2
IX. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
NAFTA establishes an institutional framework for its administration and
procedures for the settlement of disputes. NAFTA contains a general dispute
resolution mechanism as well as specialized dispute settlement provisions
relating to investment' and appeals of antidumping and countervailing
0 Id. at ch. 15, art. 1502.
18 Id at art. 1504.
182 Mexico passed significant new antitrust legislation in 1992. For a discussion of the
issues, see Craig Marquiz, The North American Free Trade Agreement and the Extrater-
ritorial Application of United States Antitrust Legislation: A Proposal for Change, 10 AR1Z.
J. INT'L AND COMP. L. 139 (1993).
'" See Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive
Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 INT'L LAW. 727 (1993); Gary N. Horlick and
F. Amanda DeBusk, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 21 (1993).
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duty cases.'4 In addition, as previously explained, the NAFTA supple-
mental agreements on environment and labor cooperation have separate
dispute resolution mechanisms.'8 5
NAFTA establishes a Free Trade Commission, comprised of cabinet-level
representatives of each party.'" In addition, Chapter 20 establishes a
Secretariat to provide assistance to the Commission and the NAFTA dispute
resolution panels." 7
There are three stages of dispute resolution under Chapter 20 of NAFTA.
The first stage, consultation, is the primary method of dispute settlement."s
If the parties are unable to agree upon a solution, any party may request a
meeting of the Commission. The Commission may decide (1) to seek the
advice of technical consultants or create working groups of experts; (2) to
have recourse to good offices, mediation, or consultation; or (3) to issue
recommendations to resolve the dispute. I8 9
In the event the dispute is still unresolved after 30 days, any consulting
party may request the establishment of an arbitral panel to consider the
dispute. The arbitral panel will have five members chosen from a roster of
individuals. The arbitral panel will hear the case under procedural rules
which guarantee at least one hearing and arguments by the parties. The
panel may also request information and technical advice from independent
experts or scientific review boards. The panel will issue an initial and a final
report evaluating the dispute. The parties are then expected to agree on
correcting the problem or on compensation. If the parties cannot reach a
satisfactory resolution, the complaining party may suspend equivalent
benefits to the other party.19°
The NAFTA parties retain their right to bring a dispute before the GATT
as well as NAFTA. If a complaining party chooses the GATT, it must first
notify the NAFTA party, which has the right to demand consultation over
the choice of forum. The respondent party has the right to insist that the
dispute be settled under NAFTA if it involves environmental, safety, health,
See Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Chapter 19 of the NAFTA: Binational Panels as the Trade
Courts of Last Resort, 27 INT'L LAw. 707 (1993).
'
85 See generally, Louis B. Sohn, An Abundance of Riches: GATT and NAFTA Provisions
for Settlement of Disputes, 1 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 3 (1993).
n6 NAFIA, ch. 20, art. 2001.
187 Id. at art. 2002.
's Id. at art. 2006.
'89 Id. at art. 2007.
'90 Id. at arts. 2008-2019.
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or conservation issues or arises under specific environmental agreements.1 9
The dispute resolution provisions are some of the most important aspects
of NAFTA. Flexible and non-confrontational, they provide a process for the
political resolution of virtually all types of disputes between three sovereign
states, neighbors, that have chosen to work closely together. Over time there
will be a significant international law jurisprudence that will be a model for
the future.
X. NAFrA AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM
Regardless of the effect of NAFTA in North America, what will be the
impact on the global trading system? Several United States trading partners
express the view that NAFTA may create an exclusive regional economic
block."92 They fear that NAFTA will create a kind of "fortress North
America" that will disrupt the post-war international trading system and the
GATT by closing North America to products from non-NAFrA nations. 93
According to classic economic theory, a free trade agreement such as
NAFTA has a twofold effect: (1) There will be trade creation among the
parties involved because certain goods that were formerly procured
domestically will now be imported; this will produce a positive, efficient
result, and (2) There will be trade diversion since certain goods that were
formerly procured from third countries will be imported from within the free
trade area; this is a negative, inefficient result because trade diversion leads
to increased production by higher-cost member state producers at the expense
of lower-cost producers from third countries. Thus, the free trade area must
be judged according to whether trade creation outweighs trade diversion."9
However, the application of this analysis to a modern free trade agreement
such as NAFTA is far from an easy task. NAFTA addresses not only the
removal of tariffs and other border measures but also a host of other issues
such as technical standards and regulations, services, investment, intellectual
property, competition, labor laws, and environmental laws. Moreover,
191 Id. at art. 2005.
'92 See, e.g., Japan to Express Concern Over NAFTA, JAPAN ECON. NEwswlRE, Oct. 22,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, JEN File.
'9' See, e.g., Bob Davis, Sweetheart Deals; Pending Trade Pact with Mexico, Canada Has
a Protectionist Air, WALL ST. J., July 22, 1992, at Al.
'" See generally JACOB VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION IssuE (Anderson Kramer
Associates, eds., 1961) (discussing a pioneering analysis of free trade).
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NAFTA is paralleled in many respects by the Uruguay Round of GATT
trade negotiations, which deals with many of the same non-tariff issues and
will reduce the tariffs applied by NAFTA and non-NAFTA nations alike.
Furthermore, both the trade diversion and trade creation aspects of NAFTA
depend upon future events and decisions by the private economic actors
endeavoring to react to the changing circumstances of both the regional and
international trading systems. Thus, no definitive judgment can be made
whether NAFTA trade creation will outweigh trade diversion.
One can, however, assess NAFTA by identifying the aspects that lead to
trade diversion by favoring member state goods. In general, NAFTA will
cause trade diversion by (1) eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade
that will continue to apply to non-NAFTA producers; and (2) applying rules
of origin to many products that favor the use of North American inputs over
inputs imported from non-NAFTA nations. For many products special rules
of origin require a threshold of regional content in order to receive the
benefits of NAFTA treatment. 9" These rules of origin are protectionist in
character since they make it possible to deny NAFTA benefits to goods
containing significant foreign-sourced components. An egregious example
is the "yarn forward" rule for textiles, which requires the spinning of yarn,
processing of fabrics, cutting, sewing, and finishing garments to be done in
North America for duty-free treatment. Only the raw fibers may be procured
from outside the area. Critics charge that this and other NAFTA North
American content requirements are discriminatory."9
Thus, for producers in non-NAFTA countries, the effect of NAFTA will
depend on how they will be able to either overcome or adjust to these trade
'" NAFTA specifies "special," enhanced rules of origin for several hundred different
products. See NAFTA, ch. 4, art. 403, and the annexes to Chapter 4. Minimum North
American content requirements apply to such products as autos, auto parts, computers, and
certain electronic products.
'96 James Bovard, NAFTA's Protectionist Bent, WALL ST. J., July 31, 1992, at A12.
Nevertheless, textile imports into the U.S. already are subject to both tariffs and quotas under
the Multifiber Arrangement. Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec.
20, 1973, 25 U.S.T. 1001, 930 U.N.T.S. 166. Thus NAFTA's additional trade diversion effect
will be limited. Moreover, there are significant exceptions to the "yarn forward" rule for
fabrics in short supply in North America (such as Harris tweed and wide-wale corduroy).
NAFTA, ch. 3, annex 300-B, §§ 2, 3; Id. at ch. 4, annex 401.1, § XI, ch. 62, n. 2. Some
cotton and man-made fiber blended fabrics are allowed full NAFTA benefits if cut, sewn, or
assembled in a NAFTA country. Id. at ch. 3, annex 300-B, §§ 2, 3; Id. at ch. 4, annex 401.1,
§ XI. Some non-qualifying yarn and fabric are eligible for tariff-rate quotas. Id. at annex
300-B, app. 6(B).
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diversion aspects. There are three ways to do this. First, non-NAFTA
nations may press for rapid implementation of the Uruguay Round trade
concessions. The trade diversion effect of NAFTA will be lessened to the
extent that the GATT multilateral trading system approaches the market
access provisions of NAFTA itself. Second, out-of-region producers should
pay great heed to the particular rules of origin that affect their products. In
many cases, the stringent rules of origin will be phased in over several years;
thus there will be time to plan and reallocate resources to minimize trade
diversion. Third, non-NAFTA producers may press their governments to
offer the NAFTA nations trade concessions in return for relaxation of the
rules of origin or even association agreements with NAFTA; certain nations
may be accepted for full NAFTA membership.' 9
NAFTA fits easily within GATT article XXIV, which permits the
establishment of free trade areas even though this is a derogation from the
most-favored-nation principle of GATT article I. Article XXIV recognizes
and permits free trade areas that involve "substantially all the trade" between
the constituent parties as long as "the duties and other regulations of
commerce" of the free trade area countries are 'not ... higher or more
restrictive than the corresponding duties and other regulations ... existing ...
prior to the formation of the free trade area."'" This vague language is an
easy hurdle; no free trade area in the history of the GATT has failed this
test. NAFTA involves "substantially all trade" among Mexico, Canada, and
the United States; and despite the stringent new rules of origin, disqualified
goods from non-NAFTA nations still will be eligible for MFN tariff
treatment. A further weakness of any argument that NAFTA is inconsistent
with GATI obligations is the fact that there is no generally accepted
standard for rules of origin under the GAT or international law. In view
of the proliferation of regional economic groupings involving rules of origin,
it is advisable to address this issue at the GATT and adopt binding
standards.' 99
'97NAFTA, ch. 22, art. 2205 (providing for accession of new members). This might be
adapted to association or "parity" status, as has been done for 24 Caribbean and Central
American nations.
'"GATr, art. XXIV:5(b).
199 A draft agreement on rules of origin has been negotiated, but this does not cover
preferential rules of origin in free trade areas or customs unions. See Draft Agreement on
Rules of Origin, Dec. 20, 1991, GAT Doc: MTN.TNC/W/FA, at D.l-14. See also Richard
H. Steinberg, Antidotes to Regionalism: Responses to Trade Diversion Effects of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 315, 350-51 (1993).
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Thus, both in economic and legal terms NAFTA appears to be consistent
with GATT norms and the global multilateral trading system. In fact, the
approval of NAFTA makes implementation of the Uruguay Round even
more imperative. NAFTA approval also carries great political implications
by rejecting protectionism and isolationism and by confirming the world
leadership of the United States in economic and trade matters.
CONCLUSION
NAFTA is part of an important historical trend that is reshaping the
economies of the Americas and political relationships among American
nations. A whole new economic vision has come to the fore: a rejection of
economic nationalism, protectionism, and government control in favor of free
trade, private-sector initiatives, and market-based economic growth. NAFTA
is a milestone on the way toward realizing this vision. Mexico now sees its
future well-being in free markets and in association with the United States
and Canada. In doing so, it is opening its own market to its northern
neighbors as well. NAFTA thus permits the residents of all three countries
to maximize their incomes by buying where things are cheapest and selling
where it is possible to recover the highest return.
The NAFTA Side Accords on Labor and Environmental Cooperation usher
in a new era in trade agreements among sovereign states. Trade agreements
no longer focus primarily upon border measures such as tariffs and quotas.
Instead they increasingly go beyond traditional concerns such as most-
favored-nation and national treatment to address areas of domestic law and
policy. NAFTA is the first trade agreement to cover important issues of
labor and environmental law that formerly were considered matters of
domestic political determination. Under NAFTA, Mexico, the United States,
and Canada accept, as an international obligation, the duties (1) to substan-
tively adhere to high standards of environmental protection and workers'
rights; and (2) to enforce those standards. Moreover, both Side Agreements
provide procedures that will ensure public participation by non-governmental
organizations and concerned individuals. The agreements are process-
oriented with sophisticated dispute settlement procedures, and they provide
for sanctions as well as potentially embarrassing disclosures in the event of
failure to comply with the Agreements or determinations made by dispute
settlement bodies. Although the political motivation for the Side Agreements
is Mexico, they apply equally to the United States and Canada. It will be
ironic when, as is sure to happen, the United States, which pressed for the
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Agreements against its reluctant NAFTA partners, finds itself accused of
environmental or labor law failures in future cases before the environment
or labor commissions.
NAFTA has the potential to effect an historic transformation that will end
the huge economic and political chasm between the Mexico and the United
States that has given rise to so many problems in the past. NAFTA will
cause Mexican wages to rise, improve environmental protection, and is the
best hope for dealing with illegal Mexican immigration, whose root cause is
the huge imbalance in wages and living standards between Mexico and the
United States.
NAFTA will also transform political relations not only with Mexico but
with the whole of Latin American. Approval of NAFTA will usher in an era
of good feeling that will enable many other problems and historic grievances
to be addressed. It may be possible to achieve a Western Hemisphere free
trade area and even a Pacific Rim trade area in the not-too-distant future.
Rejection of NAFTA will cause a backlash of disillusionment that will
spread throughout Latin America.
NAFTA means further progress toward a democratic and prosperous
hemisphere and world. In contrast, rejection of NAFTA would call our
entire relationship with Latin America into question.
NAFTA is consistent with the historic values that the U.S. has stood for
in this century. In the words of Herbert Stein, former chairman of the
President's Council of Economic Advisers:
For the past 50 years the U.S. has taken the lead in the
reduction of world-wide barriers to international trade. That
policy contributed to our own prosperity. But the expecta-
tion of that was not the sole or indeed the major reason for
our policy. The economic benefits for us were always
indirect and difficult for any individual to foresee, whereas
the dislocations involved for particular sectors were easy to
dramatize. What carried the day for liberal trade policy was
the case beyond the addition of some tenths of a percent to
the national income of the U.S. It was the recognition that,
in addition to serving our economic interest, liberal trade
policy was an application of American principles, an
expression of American concern for the well-being of others,
and above all that it made a contribution to the stability of
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the world we live in.20°
NAFTA is good for the United States. There will be little immediate
impact, but in the medium- and longer-terms NAFTA will produce economic
growth and jobs for U.S. workers. NAFTA creates an unprecedented
opportunity to improve environmental protection and cooperation on
environmental and economic issues in North America.
m Herbert Stein, No Need to Be Scared of NAFTA, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1993, at A18.
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